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AIR POLLUTION
EXPANDING CITIZENS REMEDIESf
JOHN W. VAN DOREN*
"Apparently, in this strange country we just continue practices which
injure our neighbors until enough people get mad and make us quit."
Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action 12 (1970)
I
INTRODUCTION
"Like a breath of fresh air" goes the expression. It may soon be nec-
essary to replace that expression with "as filthy as the air."
Air pollution contaminates persons and property causing damage total-
ling billions of dollars, as well as taking a huge toll as a psychological de-
pressant and efficiency drain.1 Recent focus on air and other pollution has
produced predictions of environmental holocaust. Prophets of doom argue
that population expansion may destroy man as a race.2 Some reformers
argue for birth control and severe limitations on the birth of additional
children. Expanding population is said to be "polluting" in itself, threat-
ening not only the human and animal habitat but the vitality of the human
spirit. Thus, persons concerned with ecology urge preservation of open
space areas for man, animals, and plants necessary or helpful to the re-
generative cycles which sustain life.
Some are not so pessimistic as to forecast nature's day of judgment.
Biologist Rene Dubois in common with the doomsday prophets recognizes
that unlimited economic growth may be incompatible with continued hu-
man life. But he finds inherent limits on population expansion and the
amount of goods that can be produced. Confirming a fundamental faith
in the adaptability of man and his institutions to the challenge of the en-
vironment, he finds that man will draw a line short of his own extinction.3
Those concerned with environmental catastrophe have had occasion to
review the automobile. Auto exhaust causes at least 60% of the air pol-
lution in major cities.4 Some feel that the internal combustion engine is
t The writer wishes to acknowledge the suggestions and research aid of Miss Jean Kavanaugh,
former Student, Florida State University College of Law, and now member of the State Bar of
Florida in writing this artide.
*Associate Professor Florida State University College of Law.
1 See, e.g., Comment, Regional Control of Air and Water Pollution in the San Francisco Bay
Area, 55 CALIF. L REV. 702,703-04 (1967) and note 45 infra.
2 See generally P. EHirtCiH, POPULATION BOMB (1968).
8 Lecture at Florida State University Lecture Series by R. Dubois April 14, 1970; see Blake-
slee, Industry Urges to Seek Quality, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1970, at 48, col 1; Dubois, The Limits
of Adaptability in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 27 (1970).
4 See Comment, Regiofal Control of Air and Water Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area,
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an inveterate polluter unsalvagable by a number of smog control devices.'
They would call for a complete changeover to electric or steam, or an
abandoning of the automobile itself.8
At stake, besides the future of man, is much of the conventional wis-
dom and folklore of capitalism, and the scientific and technological revo-
lutions proceeding from the industrial revolution. We need not subscribe
to the doomsday theory to see the questions implicit in this confrontation.
Is there validity in the assumptions drawn from the Adam Smith economic
model that if men pursue their own self-interest the public good will
emerge ?' What will be the cost in terms of environmental destruction if
the continued multiplication of gross national product is the chief end of
mankind?
II
THE NEED FOR LEGAL CONTROLS
At the outset, we ask whether industry is likely to allocate resources in
an attempt to remedy pollution problems without external impetus. His-
torically, many questions of resource allocation have been determined by
the federal government through the income tax, or to some extent by leg-
islative and judicial decisions which place liability on industry.8 Industry
has generally responded to increased tax and liability by passing on sub-
stantial portions through increased prices.9 The public response has gen-
55 CALIF. L REv. 702, 709 (1967) citing a 1966 interview with D. J. Cauaghan, Bay Area Air
Pollution Control District Officer in San Francisco who was referring to California's Bay Area
air pollution.
Some estimates of the percentage of photochemical smog caused by automobile exhaust go as
high as 90%. See Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Air Pollution of
Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L REV. 17, 19 (1966-67).
5 Bill #778 passed the California Senate banning the internal combustion engine in Califor-
nia after 1975. The bill did not get out of the Assembly Committee. Cf. Kennedy, The Legal
Aspects of Air Pollution Control with Particular Reference to the County of Los Angeles, 27
SO. CALIF. L REV. 373, 394 (1954) (implying that if the hazard to life and property were
great enough autos could be banned).
But see 2 CCH CLEAN AIR AND WATER NEws, No. 12 at 7 (March 19, 1970). A joint
committee of the N. Y. Legislature considering a bill to ban the internal combusion engine after
1975 brought forward a statement from a spokesman for the oil industry. He said that an es-
sentially pollution free engine could be developed before a feasible alternative vhicle could be ef-
fectively marketed.
(;See V. BUSH, PIEcES OF THE AcTION 213, 230 (1970) (Steam engine better---air pollution
will ultimately force us to get rid of the internal combustion engine); H. STILL, THE DIRTY ANI-
MAL 201 (1967) (automobile itself with its internal combustion engine is obsolete).
7 P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMiCS 38 (6th ed. 1964) (Adam Smith found that each individual
pursuing his own selfish good achieves the best good for all). While the Adam Smith model
has been rejected at least in part by later economists, a good deal of the lore of it seems to remain.
Cf. id. at 621-22 (rejecting the notion that the public interest is necessarily served by such model
and arguing that even Adam Smith himself only would have argued that it was efficient in eco-
nomic terms not that it necessarily achieved any other societal goals).
8 See generally Green, The Law fust Respond to the Environment, 47 TExAS L RPV. 1327
(1969).
9 See P. NADER, UNSAF AT ANY SPEED 167 (1965). The automobile industry tends to
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erally been increased wage demands, and presumably some response
through the political process, coupled with less effective complaints about
the weather and letters to the editor. While the market provides some
check through, for example, refusals to buy or shifts to alternative prod-
ucts, by and large, corporate decisions on allocation of resources and price
may be subject to even less popular check than governmental decisions.
Given a wide latitude in decision making, business attitudes have varied
in the exercise. "The public be damned" summed up one nineteenth cen-
tury view of the responsibility of business to the public. Perhaps industry
today cannot be as cavalier about some aspects of the public interest as this
statement indicates. Many products today are relatively standardized and
the emphasis turns more to consumer conditioning through advertising and
attendant concern for corporate image. Professor Berle points out certain
further limitations on the unfettered exercise of corporate decision making
power. He points to corporate conscience, potential legal intervention
through regulatory agencies and the danger that if corporate power is
abused dramatically against a public consensus, additional legal interven-
tion may occur.?0
But corporate managers have wide discretion over which the public has
no substantial check. Corporate power perpetuates and protects itself.
Corporate use of Madison Avenue tends to mold a consensus through ad-
vertising image making and curtail a consensus from developing against it.
Corporations also exercise considerable control over government. Corpo-
rate conscience, also, tends to be tempered if not directed by a built-in
logic of ever expanding profits which is not always conducive to the public
interest. Shareholder democracy as a potential check is, of course, a myth.
There is increased awareness of the potential forum of shareholder meet-
ings as a place to question decisions. But the separation of real control
from shareholder ownership and the concentration of corporate power in
the very few mitigates against any broad based democratic check through
the existing structure." We also have little access to information on why
corporate decisions are made. No one representing the public interest is
necessarily present when the decisions are made. Presidents of automobile
absorb the billions required for restyling, but for improvement to control exhaust emissions they
will have to "bill the public."
The costs of prevention of pollution are substantial and, if necessary, must be passed on to the
ultimate consumer. See Renkin v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. Ore.
1963).
10 A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 90-93 (1959).
11 See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 124,
125 (1933); A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 74 (1959) (stockholders politely called
"owners" exist on the condition they do not interfere with management).
See also A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 46
(1933) (as early as 1930 ultimate control of nearly half of industry in the hands of a few hun-
dred men); A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 51 (1959) (small oligarchy of men con-
trolling trust fund wealth will begin to exercise vote to control of shares).
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companies may feel under no obligation to answer public questions about
why it is necessary to pollute the environment. Perhaps some institutional
or legal procedures should be developed whereby the public eye can be fo-
cused on the corporate decision making process.
Some would put the case against the corporations much stronger. Pow-
erful interests resist pollution control overtly and covertly since they find
pollution profitable and its remedy expensive. 2 In the context of the auto-
mobile and air pollution, Vannevar Bush, though generally friendly to
corporate enterprise, finds the auto industry is "incapable of effective inno-
vative cerebration." He notes the historical failure of the auto companies
to even attempt to find out if there are better engines. He concludes that
where a few companies make a single product, have no forceful incentive
to change, and the cost of entry into the field is prohibative, no substantial
innovation is likely.13(a)
Ralph Nader suggests that the automobile industry has ignored the
problem of air pollution because of its own economic interest.13 (b) Sup-
porting this thesis, a leading economist has recently taken the position that
industry has very little, if any, duty to remedy social problems, including
pollution. The essense of this position is indicated in his title: The
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. Pollution con-
trol costs money and does not normally increase profits. Hence, business
has a duty, but that is to refrain from spending money for pollution con-
trol or other social problems.14(a) Nader further criticises the general in-
difference of the auto industry toward the social effects of its business.
Photochemical smog discovered by Arlie Haagen-Smit was not only not
defined by the auto industry, but the industry denied the relationship be-
tween exhaust and smog for several years.14(b) He also indicates that only
when competition outside the auto industry created an exhaust control de-
vice did the auto companies surface with the one they had developed. 5
12 See Reitz, The Role of the "Region" in Air Pollution Control, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
809, 812 (1969).
13(a) See BUSH, PIECES OF THE AcTION 211,228-230 (1970).
13(b) R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 152-53 (1965) (Industry seems to have decided
that cleaning exhaust neither reduces costs not increases sales so why do it?). See also VERLEGER
& CRoWLEY, Air Pollution, Water Pollution, Industrial Cooperation and the Antitrust Laws, in
4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 475, 480 (1969), implying that industry research to control pollution
produces not a nickel more of profit and competition is no impetus, so "cooperation" within in-
dustry should be allowed.
14(a) See Freidman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, New
York Times, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine) at 32.
14(b) R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 147-49 (1965) (The role of the auto in producing
smog was found by Mr. Haagen-Smit who was outside the automobile industry - the industry
itself felt no obligation to engage in research themselves or support outside inquiry).
'r See EsposiTo, VANISHNG Am 40-41 (1970); R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 159-61
(1965).
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The tactic was to delay the implementation until a higher profit margin
could be gained on its sale.16
It has been suggested, on the other hand, that some companies are con-
scious of the social effects of their products and voluntarily spend large
sums to mitigate the harm.'7 Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the
prevailing pattern. It is also suggested that a "new breed" of corporate
managers sensitive to the environment may be emerging or simply that it
will be good business to protect the environment as part of corporate image
building. Some trend may be recognizable but any really significant de-
velopments remain to be seen.
A recent antitrust complaint alleging suppression of technological de-
velopment of smog control devices against the major automobile com-
panies has highlighted the possibility of corporate irresponsibility in the
field of air pollution. The complaint makes the following allegations:
for at least the period from 1964 to 1967 the major automobile manufac-
turers were capable of installing smog control devices and agreed to delay
their introduction." Despite the fact that the companies were able to in-
stall the devices in 1966, they agreed to tell California regulatory agencies
that exhaust auto pollution measures would be technologically impossible
before 1967. Only under regulatory pressure made possible by competing
device manufacturers not in the auto industry did they agree to a require-
ment that devices be installed in 1966. The complaint also alleged that
the auto companies agreed to restrict publicity relating to research and de-
velopment efforts concerning the motor vehicle as a pollution problem.'9
The suit presents interesting alleged data. It may be surmised that a
reason for settling on a consent decree was to avoid the unfavorable pub-
licity.20 If true, the allegations would indicate that some independent
check on what is technologically feasible is necessary. That industry may
not be worthy of complete trust in operating in the public interest seems
supported. Regulatory agencies may not be able to take all statements of
industry at face value as to what is technologically feasible. One reason
alleged as to why the devices were suppressed was the desire for a higher
profit margin before they were released.21 This tends further to sup-
16 Lecture by Ralph Nader at Pitzer College, May 22, 1968, from typed transcript of tape
recording at p. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the NADER LECTRE).
17 Industry has come a long way voluntarily by the action of individual companies although
they may well have acted in anticipation of government controls. See J. PERRY, OUR POLLUTED
WORLD, CAN MAN SURVIVE? 176 (1967). Industry, with very few exceptions, will do the job
and cooperate fully in air pollution abatement, if officials charged with abatement are honest and
competent Seamans, The Mechanics of Legislative & Regulatory Action, in NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON AIR POLLUTION 315, 316 (1963).
18Complaint, United States v. Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n, Civil No. 69-75-J.W.C.
(C.D. Cal., filed January 10, 1969).
19 Id.
20 See ESPOSITO, VANISH-NG AIR 45 (1970).
2 1 See note 16 supra, and accompanying text
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port the conflict between emphasis on ever-increasing profits-corporate
greed if you will-and the public welfare. This action is discussed further
in a later part of this article.'
In addition to the lack of innovation in terms of a major change of auto
engines, there is no substantial independent check on what is technological-
ly feasible. The present locus of major research in engineering also does
not promote overpowering confidence in industry's statements about its lack
of technological capability to cope with pollution. No substantial research
exists in the universities on many aspects of automotive engineering. The
schools turn out generalized engineers which feed into Detroit. The
monopoly of technological information concentrated at Detroit makes it
very difficult to have external sources call them to account for possible mis-
representations, delays, and suppression of technological developments.m
In summary, there are a number of reasons for pessimism about a
laissez faire approach to environmental problems: the corporate emphasis
on ever larger profits, the large unchecked area of discretion in manage-
ment, the frustrating inability of the public to know where to bring about
change, and the lack of substantial checks on industry's representations
about its ability to comply with standards. Still, the rising tide of public
sentiment seems to have been effective in bringing about a climate recep-
tive to enactment of laws relating to pollution. Some have seen the only
hope for meaningful and sustained enforcement arising out of an aroused
citizenry.24 That it will continue and be able to translate itself into real
enforcement is problematic. Thus, without some interposition of legisla-
tive, judicial or other governmental action through coercion, incentives, or
both, the corporate managers will probably not respond significantly to the
pollution problem.m De-emphasis on profits and on ever increasing gross
national product runs counter to much deeply embedded economic, reli-
gious, and psychological preconditioning of the American character. That
a real change may come in this area is perhaps the real hope - and one
about which it is difficult to be optimistic.
III
ADMINISTRATIVB AGENCY OR JUDICIAL APPROACH
If the public cannot rely upon industry to voluntarily counter pollution
problems, what role should the courts play in resolving conflicts between
22 See notes 92-120 infra and accompanying text.
23 See NADER IEcruRE supra note 16, at 3, in support of this paragraph.
2 4 See Reitze, The Role of the "Region" in Air Pollution Control, 20 CASE W. RES. I. REV.
809, 820 (1969).
2 6 See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967
DUKE L. J. 1126, 1127 & n.4 (1967) (coal, steel and electrical power industries by strong opposi-
tion gained defeat of national uniform emission standards for specific pollutants in Air Quality Act
of 1967).
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the competing interests? In assessing the role of the courts, it may be
helpful to look briefly at the legislative and administrative responses. Gen-
erally, legislatures have responded to pollution problems by setting up ad-
ministrative agencies to set standards and police the problems. Some
reasons for being pessimistic about the role of administrative agencies in
the pollution context are:
(1) Access to and influence over administrative agencies may be so lim-
ited that they are controlled or rendered ineffective by the interests
they regulate;26
(2) Agencies tend to be remiss in enforcement and without adequate
sanctions in the event of violation; 27
(3) Agency effectiveness may be hampered by delays in the adminis-
trative process. 28
It is often conceded that administrative agencies have been taken over
or rendered ineffective by the interests they seek to regulate.29 It has been
argued that administrative agencies per se are outmoded and unresponsive
to the public needs. Often the heads of administrative agencies do not
conceive their role as innovative forceful regulators, due to their own
policy views, pressures from those on whom their jobs depend, general
bureaucratic inertia, fear of making waves, inadequate financing and the
like. Often when an agency official is innovative, industry is heard
through the political processes it controls and the offender is removed.
There is also a tendency for the officials of boards to go to work for the
industry they regulate . °  This process is not conducive to decisions which
26 See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in National Resource: Law Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MicI- L. REv. 473, 498 (1970) : The author calls inequality of access to and influence
over administrative agencies one of the very difficult problems of American government and low
visibility decision making the most pervasive manifestation of the problem. A diffuse majority
is made subject to the will of a self-interested and powerful minority which often has undue in-
fluence on the public resource decisions of legislative and administrative bodies and cause those
bodies to ignore broadly based interests. Id. at 560.
27 See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967
DUKE L. J. 1126, 1126-27 (1967) (state and local control programs with very few exceptions
are non-existent, ineffective, or poorly enforced).
2 8 A case study in agency ineffectiveness including a delay of at least 11 years and corporate
obstinacy in relieving air pollution in West Virginia; see Kenworthy, West Virginia Representa-
tive Tells of 11-year Struggle, Still Going on to Cut Pollution at Power Plant, N. Y. Times, July
6, 1970, at 30, col. 1.
29 See DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 81 (paperback (... ed. 1970) (established inter-
ests control agencies); ef. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1970, at 47, col. 1-4. That article states that the
Eckhardt bill in Congressional Committee would allow consumer class actions against manufac-
turers for fraudulent, unfair and deceptive practices. A committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion opposed this and offered instead that after the Justice Department had successfully prose-
cuted an offender the F.T.C. be authorized to give damages. Congressman Eckhardt preferred
his bill on the basis that Washington lawyers could plead over lunch to agency commissioners
and "had ways" of influencing them, whereas class actions litigated in open court were not subject
to such methods. Cf. Jaffee, Going After the F.T.C., 5 HARV. CIrv. RIGHTS--CIrv. LIB. L. REV.
192, 195 (1970) (growing conviction that direct judicial enforcement offers a greater potential
than administrative process).
30 See DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 80 (paperback ed. 1970) (agencies are proving
grounds for high salaried industrial positions).
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might appreciably damage the business interest of the future employer.
Moreover, sometimes the air pollution boards are composed of members
of the polluting industries, a system hardly designed to bring about dy-
namic change."' Moreover, lobbying by industry tends to prevent changes
with real teeth.2
Existing legislation may not include adequate sanctions for enforce-
ment. The Air Quality Act of 1967 has been described as unenforceable
and unworkable due to procedural disabilities with virtually no meaning-
ful sanctions for violation. 33 Such sanctions as edst for failure to imple-
ment programs under the Act probably will be reduced in effectiveness by
possible delays which industry can utilize. Hence, critics maintain that the
Air Quality Act is a window dressing and that until public pressure de-
mands meaningful legislation nothing will be done. 4
Yet the administrative agency approach to pollution control could be
effectiveY3  Expertise could be gathered. Agencies could set air purity
standards without the cumbersome and polka dot effect of a case-by-case
approach of the courts. Also, there is some injustice in a case-by-case ap-
proach which causes one company to expend millions of dollars on air
pollution control, and allows a competitor company or industry to go by
unscathed. It is not certain, however, that administrative agency enforce-
ment would be industry-wide or across the board. The very nature of a
state rather than federal approach involves danger of a crazy quilt enforce-
ment. Companies in states having strict enforcement could suffer vis a vis
their competitors in states with lax enforcement."'
Even potential effectiveness of the administrative process is not good
enough. In absence of proof of responsiveness of the administrative agen-
des something must be done. We turn to the judicial process. Criticisms
of court action are:
(1) expertise is not sufficient;
3 1 See EsPosro, VANISHING AIR 194 (1970).
321d. at 259.
33 See Reitze, supra note 24 at 814-816 (Air Quality Act of 1967 is grossly underfinanced,
meaningful sanctions largely non-existent and probably will not work); ESPOSITA, VANISHING
Am 152-168 (1970); 2 CCH CLEAN AIR & WATER NEws, No. 20, at 4 (May 14, 1970). (Fed-
eral Bar Association President Paul Treusch finds the present Clean Air Act unenforceable from
the practical standpoint); see generally O'Falon, Deficiencies in The Air Quality Act of 1967,
33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 275 (1968).
34 See note 33 supra.
25See NADER, UNSAFI AT ANY SPEED 155-56 (1965): Los Angeles County air pollution
control authority has cleaned up stationary sources of pollution-steel, refineries, shipping, rail-
roads, smelters, This is a statement by an official of the district, but even allowing for the self-
serving nature, it seems readily conceded that Los Angeles has made great strides in that direction.
And see, Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 Aiz L. REV. 90, 92 (1968)
(arguing that effectiveness has depended on criminal misdemeanor approach as opposed to injun-
tive); N. Y. Times, April 19, 1970, at 50, cols. 1-2, stating that the air pollution division of the
Ohio Pollution Control Board ordered Republic Steel Corporation either to stop discharging
red iron oxide dust from its oxygen furnaces within 90 days or close down the furnaces.
36 This is a strong argument for a federal approach to the problem.
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(2) separation of powers;
(3) irregular enforcement by happenstance of court suits.
It is submitted that the basic policy choices are ones the courts are in
no worse position to reconcile than a harassed legislature or a timid in-
dustry-controlled air pollution control agency. True, technical expertise
is not necessarily present. But courts handle some very complex questions,
such as sanity, intent and medical malpractice.
Some might claim a desirability of judicial restraint out of reverence
for separation of powers. But, for one example, the law of nuisance pro-
vides adequate precedent for resolving the competing values. Historically
courts have not hesitated to make decisions designed to protect business.
Courts struck down workman's compensation laws, and created contribu-
tory negligence to limit the spread of accident losses by insurance through
the community. Courts in the twentieth century have dealt expansively
with tort concepts. Courts have found strict liability for defectively
manufactured and designed products. Wards of the admiralty may re-
cover on almost strict liability through the unseaworthiness doctrine. The
question posed in these tort areas is who pays, and who is in the best posi-
tion to spread the cost among the community. Thus, ample precedent
exists to justify an expansive role of the court in coping with pollution
through nuisance or other remedies.3 7
Courts, while not totally insulated from political pressure, are admir-
ably secure from excessive retaliation or capture by the very industries they
in effect regulate with a particular judicial decision. Also judges do not
usually envision that they will work for the industries they judicially regu-
late upon leaving the bench. Moreover, one break-through can lead to a
pattern in the industry 3
In sum, the following premises have been suggested:
(1) air pollution is a major community problem;
(2) the legislative response of administrative agencies has been and may
well continue to prove ineffective;
(3) industry will not act significantly to control air pollution without
intervention of the legal process.
Based on these premises, the courts should increasingly concern them-
selves with the problem.-" The following recommendations and theories
are submitted as vehicles for courts and litigants to review in rethinking
the role of private law in the air pollution field:
(1) Private and public nuisance remedies should be reappraised in view
37 See generally Green, The Law M ust Respond to the Environment, 47 TEXAs L REv. 1327
(1969).
3 8 See discussion of Harvey Aluminum at and following note 58 infra.
39 See generally Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E = MC2: Environment Equals
Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 674 (1970).
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of the proliferation of contaminants: and remedies including in-
junctions and damages for personal injury and property damage
from smog and air pollution should be granted increasingly and
recognition of increased citizen standing effectuated.40
(2) The right to a dean environment should be recognized. 4 1
(3) The theory that public lands, water and air are held in trust should
be reexamined to release its potential as a private remedy against
spoilation of the atmosphere.42
(4) Where public interest in the environment is concerned, the degree
of discretion involved in administrative decisions including anti-
trust, should be reviewed.43
IV
NUISANCE
A growing amount of legal literature is being devoted to the ramifi-
cations of the nuisance remedy. Recent comment is becoming more favor-
ably disposed to the nuisance remedy.44 Certain problems involved in
nuisance actions, including the standing aspect, deserve further notice.
Problems deserving further attention are: (1) air pollution and smog,
in particular, as a contaminant causing personal injury and property dam-
age; (2) determining the party to be sued for damages resulting from
smog; (3) special damage as the key to standing in a public nuisance ac-
tion, and (4) the use of injunctions in cases where polluters can argue
that pollution is occurring despite their use of the most modern protective
devices.
Personal injury action based on nuisance may be substantiated as med-
ical studies are becoming increasingly available linking air pollution to
lung cancer, emphysema, bronchitis, and asthma.45 In general, and perhaps
in this area, medical experts seem more willing to testify to aggravation of
a preexisting condition.46  Causation in the area of property damage,
40 See notes 44-63 infra and accompanying text.
41 See notes 64-74 infra and accompanying text.
42 See notes 75-91 infra and accompanying text.
43 See notes 92-120 in ra and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 M1cIL
L. Riy. 1254 (1970).
Other possible remedies for air pollution include negligence, strict liability, product liability,
and inverse condemnation. See generally Juergensmeyer, supra note 27. Developing concepts
of strict tort liability for products creating an unreasonable risk of harm may create a major means
for pollution control. Id. at 1128-30 n.7.
45 Congressional hearings have revealed that air pollution causes substantial property damage,
as well as being a contributing factor to a rising incidence of lung cancer, emphysema, bronchitis
and asthsma. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.-
2d 312, 320 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
For a detailed economic study of the costs of air pollution in terms of health and some attempt
at quantifying property damage, see L RIDKER, ECONOMIC COSTS OF AIR POLLUTION (1967)
(Air pollution effect on health 30-5 6; collecting sources).
46 See Rheingold, supra note 4 at 20, stressing studies of aggravation of diseases from pol-
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
though seemingly potentially a problem, has been handled without much
trouble in the cases. In one case, the plaintiff convinced the court that
alfalfa leaves whitened and vegetation dropped off due to sulphur diox-
ide.1 Perhaps more difficult problems would arise in showing causation
from a generalized condition of smog. However, there is increasing
awareness of property damage done by smog.48 But when stationary
sources of air pollution have been largely curtailed and the pollution can-
not be traced to a specific factory, who is the defendant? One possibility
is to consider a class action against all drivers of motor vehicles with or
without smog control devices. 49 The major automobile manufacturers may
be another potential defendant.50 An action against the oil and gasoline
corporations to curtail the lead content of gasoline has also been sug-
gested.5
Another problem in this area is the relationship of technological devel-
opment to the application of the nuisance remedy of the injunction. In the
recent case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,52 the court, affirming a find-
ing of nuisance and damage to plaintiffs' property from defendant's cement
plant which emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations, denied an injunction which
would close the plant until the condition was remedied. The court of
appeals affirmed, seemingly because of the economic importance of the
plant. The court made two other interesting arguments in support of its
decision. A conditional decree dosing the plant, which would have been
effective eighteen months after entry of the decree, was denied because
there would be no assurance that any significant technological develop-
ment would occur within the eighteen months. The court found it un-
likely that the cement company could develop any dust control technology
in a short period of time. Such development depended on the total re-
sources of the national and worldwide cement industry. The court
stated: "For obvious reasons the rate of research is beyond control of de-
fendant."5
The dissent looked at the matter differently:
I am aware that the trial court found that the most modern dust con-
trol devices available have been installed in defendant's plant, but, I sub-
luted air. The writer has found in workmans compensation practice that doctors are often more
comfortable testifying to aggravation.
47 Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
48 See note 45 stupra.
49 Such an action could be against some defendant drivers as representatives of a class of
defendant drivers. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23, stating that one or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties.
50 Cf., Rheingold, supra note 4, at 29, suggesting a products liability action on the theory that
automobiles allowing pollutants to escape are defectively designed.
51 Id. at 29 n.64, where there is a hint of such an action against gasoline manufacturers
presumably based in part on the lead content producing pollution.
52 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
53 26 N.Y.2d at 226,257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
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mit, this does not mean that better and more effective dust control devices
could not be developed within the time allowed to abate the pollution.
In a day when there is a growing concern for dean air, highly devel-
oped industry should not expect acquiescence by the courts, but should,
instead, plan its operations to eliminate contamination of our air and dam-
age to its neighbors.54
Thus, the defendant was able to rely on the existing state of technology
to justify its conduct. This is an unfortunate precedent in an era of in-
creasing pollution. First, there is some doubt that all of industry's state-
ments about its technological development can be taken at face value."5
Secondly, the profit ethic does not seem conducive to allocation of re-
sources by private industry to combat pollution without external controls
and stimulus.'6 Thirdly, industry should bear part of the blame and the
cost of developing a product which is not made by means which are ex-
tremely damaging or which in itself produces dangerous effects. It seems
that industry is pleading its own negligence in defense of its present prac-
tices. In short, with decisions like Boomer there is relatively little incen-
tive for the cement industry to expend the necessary funds to develop
alternative means of production. Furthermore, if technology is not equal
to the task, and there is some indication that further technology is not the
sole answer, hard choices will really confront us involving a major re-
structuring of life as we know it.5"
Boomer also highlights the reluctance of courts, at least verbally, to
look beyond the private litigation to broad public objectives. The court
observed that it was rare to use a decision in private litigation to achieve
direct public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the
court. But surely courts expand rules by applying them to different situa-
tions and in so doing consider the possible effects and implications of their
decisions on the community and similar situations. For example, the court
in Renkin v. Harvey Aluminum Inc. 8 granted an injunction in similar cir-
cumstances. Therein, plaintiff, owner of a fruit farm, sought to enjoin
the defendant aluminum company from emitting harmful fluorides onto
his land and trees. The Renkin court notes that when not dealing with
the public as such, it recognized that air pollution is one of the greatest
problems facing the American public. It is true that the court in Renkin
found that existing technology could curtail the fluorides from defendant's
plant.
54 26 N.Y.2d at 231-32, 257 N.E. 2d at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
5 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
G0 See notes 13(a-15 supra and accompanying text.
57 That technological "solutions" may be incompatible with perpetuation of the environment
is foreign to the thought patterns of twentieth century minds--except some. See Murdoch and
Connell, All About Ecology, THE CErNTER MAGAZINE 56, 62-63 (1969).
58226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
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Renkin gives an answer to another argument of the Boomer court. The
court in Boomer noted that defendant was only one of the many plants
polluting the Hudson Valley. But the Renkin court, having a precedent
which compelled Reynolds Aluminum to adopt the control device, was
able to bootstrap by using that as a precedent for Harvey Aluminum to
adopt. Similarly, putting one of the polluters on notice could provide
precedent for bringing the others into line.
Several other pitfalls await the reformer who uses nuisance as a rem-
edy. The finding of nuisance itself, involving unreasonable harm, sub-
stantial harm, causation, balancing the equities if an injunction is involved,
as well as defenses of "coming to the nuisance," laches and the statute of
limitations all indicate punch holes where a plaintiff can be left." An-
other impediment is created by the rule that if the nuisance is public, the
citizen does not have standing unless he is particularly damaged."' The
basic consideration in all these doctrines is a balancing of the gravity and
degree of harm of the activity of the polluter with that recipient.
Courts have not been unduly shy in expanding standing. Courts avoid
the particular damage rule by allowing exceptions for persons who can
show personal injury or property damage.0' Courts also strain to avoid the
concept. In Fishermans Protective Union v. St. Helens,6" the court found
the particular damage concept satisfied. There, fishermen seeking to en-
join the discharge of waste into the Columbia River were met with the
defense that they were not affected by the pollution any more than others.
The court avoided that rule by contrasting the rights of those who actually
do fish with those who do not, and then by saying that the fishermen who
used the river were more affected than those who do not.
In many cases denying standing for lack of particular damage, the dam-
age done to plaintiff was remote and insubstantial. But in the air pollu-
tion context at least the gravity of the harm is present and substantial, and
the benefits from the activities producing them weighed against the activity
of the citizens in living is often not sufficient to justify the continuation
of the activity.
A frequent policy reason given for the rule limiting private actions
against nuisances, has been a desire to prevent a multiplicity of suits.6
Focus should be shifted to the kind and pervasiveness of the harm in-
flicted. Some multiplicity of suits might be beneficial, particularly when,
as it seems, the attorney general does not act to abate public nuisances.
Moreover, the procedural advent of dass actions would reduce effective-
ness of the multiplicity argument. Individuals harmed by smog could
59 See generally Juergensmeyer, supra note 25.
60 See W. PROSSER, TORTs 608 (3rd ed. 1964).
61 See generally Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
62 160 Ore. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939).
63 W. PROSSER, ToRTS 608 (3rd ed. 1964).
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gather in a class action, for example, to press a remedy for loss of property
values either specifically to their houses or more generally. Perhaps, also,
individuals or groups could sue for relief from deterioration of health or
lung damage. It is in any event questionable that undue multiplicity
would occur. Private litigants with sufficient funds to bring private ac-
tions may not abound.
The rigidity of the particular damage rule as applied to environment
oriented litigation should be softened judicially. Or, if it is to remain a
potential bar to actions against the polluting automobile and gasoline pro-
ducers, its presence indicates the need for adoption of other theories to
give private litigants access to the courts and legislation which would ex-
pand standing.
V
THE RIGHT TO LIFE
A growing body of legal literature is forming the contours of a con-
stitutionally protected right to life or right to a clean environment. 4 Com-
mentators have posited the right on the basis of Griswold v. Connecticut,65
including these pleasant ingredients: the fifth amendment's protection of
the sanctity of life; the ninth amendment's indication that certain rights
are retained by the people not enumerated in the Bill of Rights; and the
Declaration of Independence guarantee of life and the pursuit of happi-
ness. 6 There could also be added the recognition of rights found where
relief had been granted somewhat piecemeal in a series of specific situa-
tions. Examples include a right of free travel 7 and though not a con-
stitutional right, the right of privacy. 68
Recalling the traditional rights of the people to air and water and con-
comitant rights, 69 such rights may form a basis for recognition of a right to
a dean environment as a tradition regarded as fundamental. Some courts
have argued in a property context that the "right" of inheritance derives
04 See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E = MC2 : Environment Equals Man
Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 674, 688-692, 704 (1970) noting
that decisions as incredibly unresponsive as Boomer illustrate urgent need for a constitutionally
recognized right to an environment sustaining decent human life; Esposito, Air and Water Pol-
lution: What To Do While Waiting For Washington, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L REV.
32, 45-52 (1970) (ninth amendment plus guarantee of life implicit in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments-pollution threatens life); cf. Ottinger, Legislatiop and the Environment: Individual
Rights & Government Accountability, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 672 (1970), proposing a con-
stitutional amendment guaranteeing a wholesome and unimpaired environment. Such an amend-
ment was apparently introduced into the House of Representatives by the author in 1968.
6r 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
06 See Roberts, supra note 64 at 690-91.
67 See Schapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
68 The right to privacy was recognized in large part due to the influence of Warren and
Brandies, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARVARD LAW REv. 193 (1890).
609 See note 76 infra.
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from the pursuit of happiness part of the Constitution and supported by
inherent rights declared by the Declaration of Independence.7 ° If "hap-
piness is property," happiness is also relief from the mental and physical
problems of air pollution.
In the recent landmark case of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hoerner Waldorf Corp., the Montana District Court found a constitution-
ally protected right to life and to the health which sustains that life under
the fifth and fourteenth and possibly the ninth amendment. 0" The Court,
however, dismissed the complaint in that it found that alleged pollution
by the private corporation did not involve state action. Thus, the para-
meters of such a right have not been fully explored. One commentator
seems to suggest that the practical thrust of the right would be a kind of
procedural due process with expanded standing requiring governments to
consider the environment in its decisions.7 1 In suggesting a "procedural"
remedy in which policy decisions are referred back for consideration
of the environment and alternate ways of proceeding, this seems to
parallel the suggestions of Professor Sax, except his approach is through
the utilization of the possible flexibility of public trust doctrine rather than
constitutional rights. Left open is the question of whether such a right
would allow the individual citizen a right to: (1) attack the inaction of
state and federal officials charged with the responsibility of enforcement or
(2) allow a direct action against the private polluter on terms better for the
pollution controller than now exist for nuisance actions. A constitutional
right to a clean environment could force consideration of conservation and
environmental factors in government decision making. But a better vehicle
for such a decision as respects federal administrative decision making seems
to exist under the National Environmental Policy Act.72
One application of such a right is suggested by a case now pending. A
complaint by a private citizen in a class action makes the claim that the
National Environmental Policy Act creates a statutory right to a healthful
environment with the language, "... each person should enjoy a healthful
environment .... " The complaint requests intervention in a suit by a smelt-
ing company against an air pollution control agency to prevent enforcement
of regulations governing air pollution.73 Thus, a federal constitutional
70 See Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906) (Right of inheritance is
an inherent right based on a "right to happiness' 'and the Declaration of Independence).
70b Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., order and memorandum
no. 1694 (D. Mont., filed Aug. 27, 1970); also reported at 1 ERC 1640, 1641 (D. Mont,
1970).
71 See Roberts, supra note 64(a) at 691.
7 2 See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative
Law, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 612, 643-50 (1970) (every federal agency must consider environment
in decision making).
73 2 CCH CLEAN AIR & WATER NEWS, No. 7 at 2 (Feb. 11, 1970).
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right could support standing in suits between control agencies and alleged
polluters.
It may also be productive to search state constitutions for possible
grounds for a state recognized right to a dean environment.7 4
VI
TRUST
The focus on the development of existing law to cope with problems
of environmental abuse suggests consideration of a trust theory. Nat-
ural resources have traditionally been subject to some kind of trust held by
the government for the people. The problem is in recognizing a remedy
in the citizen to enforce a breach of the trust, or interference with the trust
rights. A central theory in proscribing such a remedy seems to be that gov-
ernment acts in the public interest and is therefore not subject to second
guessing by its citizens. Some exceptions have been made where individ-
uals are particularly affected, a similar concept to the one which entitles
citizens to bring actions where a nuisance is public. However, the general
approach of restricted standing remains, though the premise that govern-
ment does act in the public interest is subject to renewed questioning. Such
an assumption is worthy of as much scrutiny as the Adam Smith premise
that each corporation and private business doing its thing results in the
public interest.
The historical origin of resource trust law goes back to the common law,
and behind that to Roman law." At common law, the sovereign "crown"
held in trust for the people numerous rights among which are navigation,
bathing and fishing.78  Private ownership of navigable waterways was
limited generally to the high water mark. The watercourse bed, and the
shore area between high and low tide belonged to the sovereign in trust
for the people. After the American Revolution, title to these and other
lands passed to the new sovereign, referred to as the sovereign people of
each state, subject to rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the
general government.7 As new states were admitted, the states were ceded
the title to the streambed and shores subject to the trust in favor of its own
74 See, e.g., ORE. CONST. art. 1, §10, providing that every man shall have remedy by due
course of law for injury to his person, property or reputation (emphasis added); FLA. CONST.
art. I §2 (inalienable rights, life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness).
75 See generally Sax, supra note 26.
70 See generally Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE LJ. 762 (1970), which traces the development from the Roman Law to
the present and distinguishes between a common rights theory and private ownership subject to
the easements retained by the people.
At least ten such rights have been claimed at one time or atiother: navigation, ports, free pas-
sage (as a means to another protected activity), commerce, fishing, sand and stones, seaweed and
shells, bathing (recreation), conservation and aesthetics and the "public interest." Id. at 777-78.
77 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); Sax, supra note 26 at 476.
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citizens. 7s  One potential area of application of the trust theory would
seem to be in the area of water pollution. Such pollution may well inter-
fere with fishing, swimming, boating, taking oysters and the like.
The trust theory is equally applicable to the air. Under Roman Law,
it appears that air was one of the common things (res communes) whose
ownership belongs to no individual, classified with the sea and seashore.
Reference is made to the Civil Code of Louisiana defining things which all
may freely use which belong to nobody in particular such as air, sea and
its shores. In the English common law, the air, sea, seashore, rivers and
harbors are ordinarily common and available to the public."9 In most
states, the common law is a source of American unwritten law."0 The
ninth amendment is complementary in that it reserves to the people rights
traditionally held by them. If all things in the state must be either prop-
erty of the state or private property,"' then, not being private property,
ambient air may be property, title to which is held by the state. A para-
mount right of free use may exist in the citizens, superior to any particular
individual rights, similar to a public right of free navigation. When so
viewed, the title in the state subject to beneficial use in the people, indi-
cates a traditional trust relationship.
Under some circumstances at least, the state may institute an action to
reclaim trust property.82 One commentator has suggested, however, that
it has never been clear that the public had a right to compel government to
protect those rights. 3 However, it appears that some direct remedy ex-
isted in Roman Law against the private infringer when he interferred with
the common rights 4 and, the citizen may have a right to enforce the trust
by invoking analogies from trust law. 5 Failure of the state or federal gov-
ernment properly to protect such trust property as air space would consti-
tute a breach of trust. A trustee is, of course, under a duty to the benefi-
7 8 Sax, supra note 26 at 476.
7 9 C SHERMAN, 2 ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORMD 140-41 (1917).
S0 Id. at 14.
811d. at 141.
82 Sax, supra note 26 at 489.
8 ld. at 475.
84 See IxsnTutBs OF JusnmuAN 159 (Sanders ed. 1876). If proprietors attempted to exer-
cise their rights so as to hinder the public use of a bank of a river, they would be restrained by an
interdict of the preator.
85 Cf. Note, supra note 76 at 774, stating that one suggested model for maximizing benefit
from tidal water areas is to treat the state as active trustee and enforce a duty to protect rights
considered common or public easements by cost-benefit balancing.
Cf. Sax, supra note 26 at 556-57. Public trust problems are found whenever government
regulation comes into question such as controversies involving air pollution. A court decision on
a private action seeking more extensive enforcement of air pollution laws could provide the public
with substantial protection.
Public trust law includes park lands, at least to the extent of forbidding use for non-park
purposes. Id. at 556. Might a park ruined by air pollution be interference with a public right




ciary to use reasonable care and skill and preserve the trust property. And
if the trustee does not bring action to protect the corpus (air), well estab-
lished trust doctrine would allow a beneficiary citizen to bring an action
either against the state or directly against the polluter.86
Also, citizens have traditionally had a right to free navigation, both of
the waterways and airspace. Private rights, though coexistent in the same
matter-water or air-meet the end of their definition when they infringe
the navigational right. Air pollution has interfered with and promises to
present future hazards to air travel.87  Thus, to protect the right of navi-
gation it is necessary to curtail air pollution. The same objection may be
leveled, however, that the public had no clear right to compel government
to protect navigation. The absence of a remedy severely restricts a "right."
But, a private remedy to the citizen at large to protect trust property was
not unknown to the civil law. 8 The general elasticity of the standing con-
cept has been adequately illustrated89 and recent precedents expanding
standing recognize the public interest in that flexibility 0 Recognition of
a citizen remedy against the state or polluter would be complementary to
an underlying premise of these recent developments-that "private attor-
neys general" are necessary to preserve the rights of citizens against de-
termined special interests seeking private gain.
Professor Sax's stricture that courts are better confined to procedural
type remedies such as due process and referral back to government for
more adequate hearings, or consideration of other factors, would allow a
citizen to question with procedural devices the substance of decisions."
Perhaps such caution is appropriate to preserve in government a freedom
to change decisions in resource use and allocation. For the courts to adopt
a supervisory power over the questions of when and where dams, roads,
atomic energy plants and other "improvements" will be built may go too
far. But, leaving the substance of governmental decisions to government,
and prodding an inactive government to protect the air may be different
policy objectives. Also different is providing some mechanism to counter-
vail the built in favoritism of private corporations and business which may
act in disregard of public interest, and control and render inactive the gov-
ernment designed to protect the public interest. Thus, a substantial part
of the air pollution problems seems to be more one of incompatibility of
the profit motive and the public interest and government inactivity rather
86 See RPsrATm HN, (SEcoND) OF TRusTs §282 (1959).
8 7 See, e.g., Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control. The Application of the Commerce
Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASI. L. REv. 1067, 1078 (1965)
(hazard to air and ground transportation).
88 See note 84 supra.89 See generally Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Private Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideolofical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L REV. 1033 (1968).
90 See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CM. L REV. 450 (1970).
91 Sax, supra note 26 at 560, 564-65.
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than of bad decisions by government on resource allocation. Hence, it
seems more appropriate to allow private actions directly against the pollu-
ter and government bodies responsible for enforcement.
VII
POLLUTION AND ANTITRUST
In the recent case of United States v. Automobile Manufacturers As-
sociation,92 the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court opinion allowing
the Justice Department to settle an antitrust suit under the Sherman Act
without intervention by numerous states, cities and counties, as well as
class action litigants. In Automobile Manufacturers, the United States
alleged that the major auto companies:
(1) agreed to install motor vehicle air pollution control equipment only
on a uniform date determined by agreement;
(2) agreed subsequently on three separate occasions to attempt to delay
the installation of air pollution control equipment;
(3) in early 1964 agreed to attempt to delay the introduction of new
exhaust pollution control measures on motor vehicles sold in Cali-
fornia until the model year 1967 despite the fact that they were
capable of installing the improvement for the model year 1966, and
agreed to tell California regulatory officials that installation of ex-
haust antipollution measures would be impossible before 1967.
Only under regulatory pressure made possible by competing device manu-
facturers not in the automobile industries did the defendants agree to a
California regulatory requirement that exhaust devices be installed for the
model year 1966. Defendants were also charged with agreeing to restrict
publicity relating to research and development efforts concerning the mo-
tor vehicle air pollution problem.93
The list of intervenors was substantial and was composed of nine gov-
ernmental bodies including the States of New York, New Jersey, Con-
necticut and Maryland. 4 They sought to intervene under Rules 24(a) and
24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower court held that
the intervenors were not entitled to come into the lawsuit either permis-
sively or as a matter of right in that the intervention would prejudice and
delay the rights of existing parties. The court stated, correctly, that the
purpose of the intervention was to cause the matter to be litigated so a
favorable decree could be obtained. Under the legal posture, such a de-
cree could be used as prima fade evidence by the litigants who sought
treble damages.
92307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 90 S. Ct. 1105 (1970).
03 Id. and Complaint, supra note 18.
94 307 F. Supp. at 619.
[Vol. 32
AIR POLLUTION
In deciding against intervention, the court addressed itself to two basic
arguments. First, the desirability of intervention as a block to the entry
of the consent decree so the decree could be used in the intervenors' treble
damage actions; and secondly, whether the decree was in the public in-
terest. The court stated that the main goal of the intervenors, the blocking
of the proposed decree so as to obtain a favorable decree to be used in
their own treble damage actions, was not supportable. Consent decrees
were useful means of terminating the majority of antitrust suits. The de-
cision to bring and end a suit is administrative and not subject to review
by the court. However, the court did have the power to disapprove settle-
ments based on adverse consequences to persons not parties and to the
public interest. The court found that the government had no duty to pur-
sue the action to obtain a decree helpful to treble damage claimants. The
treble damage claimants could pursue their own actions. The court sur-
mised:
The Government is the designated representative of the public, and sound
policy requires that it be free to conduct and control its litigation in the
public interest.95
Was the decree in the public interest? Yes, since it gave all the relief
the Government could have obtained: the Government could lose the case,
delay was avoided and expense to an antitrust division with limited man-
power and resources was conserved. Apparently, the automobile company
resources were unlimited.
Previously a grand jury was impaneled to investigate criminal antitrust
charges against the automobile companies, but no indictment was returned.
Volumes of testimony were gathered. The decree provided that all evi-
dence and the transcript be impounded in the hands of the Justice Depart-
ment and made available by subpoena or upon showing of good cause to
treble damage claimants.98
The City of New York appealed in an action styled City of New York
v. United States, 7 as did class action litigants in the companion case, Gross-
man v. Automobile Alanufacturers Association, Inc. In the latter, the Su-
preme Court dismissed "for want of jurisdiction."9 8  Grossman involved a
class action on behalf of the American public on similar grounds to the
antitrust suit. Relief in the form of consolidation or intervention was de-
nied by the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the lack of
notice of hearing with respect to the consent decree violated due process
95 307 F. Supp. at 621.
06 307 F. Supp. at 620.
07 90 S. Ct. 1105 (1970).
98 Id.
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and in effect that approval of the decree without an admission of violation
was against the public interest.9
The effect of the Supreme Court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction is
not entirely dear. Presumably, no federal issue of substance was posed.
Arguably, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the class action liti-
gation. More likely, however, the Supreme Court's opinion just refuses to
review the lower court's exercise of discretion in refusing to allow con-
solidation or intervention by the class action litigants. Granting of such
discretionary intervention in an appropriate future case may not be pre-
cluded. The Court could have thought, however, that the public interest
was sufficiently protected by the private actions themselves. In this re-
spect, however, enormous resources may be required properly to present
the case. When the government acquiesced in a consent decree, the other
litigants and the public lost a valuable litigant.
The crucial question revolves around whether the acceptance of the
decree was in the public interest. Some questions posed, some of which
will be dealt with here, are: (1) Was anything substantial gained by the
consent decree or was it academic in view of the competing devices already
marketed? (2) Would a decree potentially obtainable through litigation
have been better than the one obtained? (3) Is the public's right to know
an appropriate criterion for rejection of a consent decree? (4) If it is un-
clear if the government theory of "product fixing" would not have been
sustained, is clarification of the anti-trust laws indicated to include the al-
leged conduct? (5) Was the settlement a political accommodation to a
powerful industry?
When should courts second guess the parties proferred resolution of
the litigation? That approval of consent decrees may be in the public in-
terest and intervention ought not be allowed in all cases of consent decrees
may be readily conceded.'00 However, some criterion for intervention and
reversal upon abuse of discretion should be established. As an aid to such
appraisal, there is considerable merit to the suggestion of Professor Ken-
neth Culp Davis that a decision to accept a consent decree should be ac-
companied by a publicly available statement of findings and conclusions
embodying the policy reasons for the decision.101 Commentators have also
suggested an informal hearing to inquire into the desirability of a con-
sent decree which is more extensive in some cases than others where third
o9 See 38 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. March 10, 1970).
100 See Comment, The Automobile Pollution Case: Intervention in Consent Decree Settle-
ment, 5 HARV. CIr. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L REV. 408 (1970). Some advantages to the procedure
of consent decree are: (1) Cost savings, (2) immediate relief, (3) obtaining more than might be
obtained by litigation of a doubtful daim on the facts and law, (4) mutual adjustment according
to facts known only to the parties, (5) effect on similar cases, (6) increased control of the terms
of the degree.
101 See note 113 inra.
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parties are represented. °2 The court might then be in a better position to
weigh the nature and extent of the public interest involved.
In evaluating the consent decree decision, we may consider the identity
of the litigants and a comparison of relief granted to what could have
been obtained. States, counties and cities were presumably not in the liti-
gation to increase their revenues with treble damages. Perhaps interven-
tion by state units should be allowed more often than other treble damage
litigants. In viewing the relief obtained, it is said that the government got
all the relief it could have obtained, under a successful trial. We see
through a glass darkly. Evaluation is quite difficult. The auto companies
succeeded in eliminating a powerful litigant at very little net loss to them-
selves. Benefit from the delays between at least 1964-1967 was already
obtained. Smog control devices had already been marketed by someone
outside the industry so that the impetus to suppress technology was less-
ened. And, the wording of the decree seems to give sufficient flexibility
to avoid major impact.103  Whether decree obtained through litigation
might have been better is extremely difficult to answer. We may also ques-
tion whether either a decree obtained through litigation or by consent will
be policed and enforced.
Reasons for allowing the litigation to proceed then come down to pub-
licity of the alleged conduct. As it was, unfavorable publicity was con-
fined to a few newspapers where it could easily be lost from sight. It
could have been hoped that such publicity might produce a public outcry
leading to a legislative investigation or a strengthening and increased en-
forcement of the criminal anti-trust laws. Thus, though it is difficult to
incorporate into a specific legal criterion, the lack of access of the public
to the alleged information can be formulated into the broad legal concept
of public interest in deciding whether to approve or reject consent decrees
and in ruling on requests for intervention. Another doctrinal possibility
is to consider that the state units or other litigants may have an "interest"
in the litigation in addition to the treble damage claim, which supports
intervention.
This litigation may indicate the inability of the presently constituted
anti-trust framework substantially to deter this kind of conduct. It has
been suggested that such conduct does not run afoul of the anti-trust
laws.1°* Public benefit results, goes the argument, because of the use of
10 2 See Comment, The Automobile Pollution Case: Intervention in Consent Decree Settle-
ment, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L REv. 408 (1970), suggesting the Justice Department
should justify the proposed decree in an informal hearing where third parties were represented.
The writer felt the justification necessary since the reasons for the settlement are known peculiarly
to the attorneys. How "informal" such a proceeding could be and whether it would become
pro forma can be questioned.
103 See EsposiTO, VANISH NG AiR 46 (1970).
104 See Verleger and Crowley, Air Pollution, Water Pollution, Industrial Cooperation and
the Antitrust Laws, 4 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 475,480 (1969).
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cooperative effort. This suggestion of non-regulation of pooling agree-
ments such as those attacked in Automobile Manufacturers may overlook
the potential adverse effect based on the enormous vested interest of the
automobile companies in the existing technology. On one level, it is un-
likely that the automobile industry will without external incentive come
up with any proposal which would not be based on the modification of
the internal combustion engine. The impetus to make major innovative
changes of technology in oligopolistic industries with one product is quite
small. No threats may be posed from other auto companies due to the
difficulty of access into the market because of capital requirements. 05 Thus,
pooling arrangements may only shackle technological developments fur-
ther.1 0
6
Furthermore, at least by hindsight, the fact that a group, not party to
these agreements, came out with a device also casts doubt on the efficacy
of this particular pooling agreement. In any event, the deterrent effect of
the present law in this field may be doubted. First, it may be unclear
whether such arrangements violate anti-trust law. 07 Commentators have
maintained that under existing anti-trust law industry has a right to col-
laborate and give false information to the government, and to meet gen-
erally, whether the result is the enforcement or the delay of progress. The
position is based on a protected right to assemble, and to assemble to in-
fluence and impede proposed laws and regulations effecting them. 08 Auto-
mobile Manufacturers disputed this. If they are allowed to continue, it is
a tacit recognition of the right of very powerful corporate forces, not only
individually but collectively to combine to continue polluting the atmos-
phere. While anti-trust action could be helpful, the ability of the legal
structure to control corporate conduct under the present power relation-
ships in the society may be limited. Thus, interestingly enough, it may not
have been the government suit, valuable as it might have been, that turned
this particular behavior from its course. It may instead have been the ad-
vent of the possibility that a competitor might commercially market a smog
control device.'0 9 Nothing substantial emerges out of the episode to dis-
courage the companies from engaging in the alleged conduct. No fines
are provided for civil anti-trust violations and in any event, the effect of
monetary sanctions on General Motors may be doubted. Accordingly,
105V. BUSH, PIECES Or THE AcTIoN 230 (1970). Bush believes that better engines exist,
and chides the auto industry for failure to innovate. He finds that the investment required is
not encouraged where an industry is structured as an oligopoly with limited access by potential
competitors.
190 Esposrro, VANIsHING AnR 43, 45 (1970) (suggesting that pooling agreements result in
controlling the quality of products in other industries by agreements not to introduce advances).
30 7 See generally Verleger and Crowley, supra note 104.
108 Verleger and Crowley, Pollution: Regulation and the Anti-trust Laws, 2 NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAWYER 131, 141 (1969).
10 9 See ESpOSrrO, VANISING Am 40-41 (1970).
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though anti-trust pressure should not be relaxed, what may be more ap-
propriate is governmental competition with the automobile companies to
keep check on what is technologically feasible." 0
It is even more difficult to speculate further on the criminal charges.
The premise that the public interest is best served by initiation and termi-
nation of litigation of this kind is worthy of scrutiny. Executive decisions
of this kind are similar to those of a regulatory agency and are no more
necessarily in the public interest than any other administrative decision.
Both may have extremely low level visibility. While some remedy may be
found through pressures of the electoral process on the executive and leg-
islature, this has not been enough.
Both the failure to return an indictment and the acceptance of the con-
sent decree raise the problem of administrative discretion, and the relation-
ship between a powerful industry and government. Traditionally, judicial
review of executive decisions has been somewhat limited.-" Though ad-
ministrative inaction is theoretically reviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act, anti-trust decisions not to prosecute have been thought un-
reviewable."2 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has recently argued that rule
making and public accounting be made for decisions not to prosecute.113
It is submitted that the need for review of anti-trust decisions not to prose-
cute is suggested by the Automobile Manufacturers situation. The Nader
study group states that:
1. The grand jury wanted to return an indictment against the automobile
manufacturers.
110 But cf. V. BUSH, PIECES oF THE AcIoN 230-31 (1970), who expresses a lack of con-
fidence in state research efforts, and suggests instead'subsidizing a private industry presumably not
the existing auto industry to come up with $100,000 steam vehicles for its own use.
1 11 See K. DAVIS, AmusTRA'ivE LAw TEXT 513-15 (1959); ordinarily the district at-
torney has almost unlimited discretion not to prosecute. Id. at 76.
112 Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act deals with judicial review. Agency action
is defined to include agency rules, etc., "or the denial thereof or failure to act." Section 2(g)
(emphasis added). Unreviewability is generally assumed with regard to enumerated conduct of
the Department of Justice, such as refusal to compromise or choice of criminal rather than equity
proceedings. Id. at 514.
113 See DAVIS, DIScRETIONARY JUSTICE A PRELIMINARY INJURY 198-205 (1969). Pro-
fessor Davis calls for administrative rule making with respect to decisions not to prosecute. A
main emphasis is the advantage of definity to industry to indicate proscribed conduct. He
states that when the antitrust division "prosecutes a case, when it decides not to prosecute,
when it decides to dismiss or to nolle prosequi, when it enters a consent arrangement, and when
it grants a clearance, it can and should state publicly the policy reasons for its action .... One
argument against announcing reasons for decisions not to prosecute is the reluctance to acknowl-
edge a practice as legal. Other reasons for not disclosing reasons are set out. Id. at 203. None-
theless, he states that, "the general practice should be to accompany all significant decisions of
substantive policy with statements of findings and reasoned opinions." Id. at 205.
Professor Davis also argues for court review of prosecution decisions to prosecute, and not to
prosecute. Id. at 207-14. He rejects separation of powers as a reason for failure to review as un-
sound and absurd since numerous decisions in fact review executive discretion. In support, his
argument is based on abuse, and on the tradition of reviewing some administrative decisions
without actually exercising the executive function. One other reason might be the potential
of public pressure resulting from an informed populace.
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2. The Department of Justice decided at the last minute not to seek crim-
inal sanctions.' 1 4
When Attorney General Ramsey Clark was asked why he dropped the
criminal case. He stated in effect:
1. It was not political pressure; it was unthinkable that the executive
would have interferred with a 'legal' decision not to prosecute;
2. That the government knew of the agreements all along and therefore,
were susceptible to a 'condonation' type defense." 5
Of course it is not provable whether Professor Davis' suggestion for a re-
view of a decision not to prosecute would have resulted in court decreed
prosecution in this instance. Such a requirement would have compelled
reasons which might inform the public and give a better basis on which
to assess the decision. Another unanswered policy question is how vigor-
ous a decreed prosecution would be. The hope is that it would lead to a
greater potential public check on these significant and otherwise unex-
plained governmental decisions.
The courts disallowance of intervention seems inconsistent with trends
widening the rights of the public to attack administrative decisions. These
problems were posed in a context of lack of administrative agency respon-
siveness to environmental concerns. Some examples are decisions of pol-
lution control agencies not to prosecute offenses and failure to set stand-
ards, and the failure of the attorney general to seek to enjoin public nuis-
ances. It has been indicated that twenty-nine states allow any citizen to
test the legality of official conduct through mandamus."' California now
has a bill pending and an initiative which allows a citizen to bring a writ
of mandamus against officials to enforce administrative action on air pollu-
tion." 
7
The issue of private standing to challenge administrative conduct
though confused and confusing seems to be broadening. Legislation to
broaden standing so that private citizens can intervene in administrative
proceedings has been introduced." 8 Recent cases have broadened the kind
114 Esposrro, VANISHING AIR 42-43 (1970).
115 Lecture by former attorney general Ramsey Clark, Florida State University, April, 1970.
116 Comment, supra note 44 at 1273 n.102 (reviewing availability of writs to compel admin-
istrative action).
117 See, e.g., proposed California Assembly Bill 109, Jan. 7, 1970, allowing a writ of manda-
mus against officials to enforce Air Resources Act, orders and regulations thereof, and class ac-
tion by any citizen residing in the county at the time an order or regulation is violated against
the violator with recovery of civil penalty.
See also, California Initiative Measure amending CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE by adding
§39600 to §39690 to be submitted to the voters. Under the initiative, polluters must reduce
and eventually eliminate their activities. If the attorney general or other state enforcement of-
ficers refuse to bring actions, any citizen may compel them to do so by mandamus. Huge fines
result for failure to comply.
118 Legislation has been introduced in California to allow "any person" to maintain an action
against a polluter. The court could allow intervention of any person in any administrative or
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of interest which will sustain standing to include aesthetic, conservational
and recreational values.119 Some statutes allow private citizens to sue in
the name of the state if the attorney general does not bring certain public
nuisance actions. 20 And, positing a right to sue on the right to a clean
environment or a trust theory could provide prima fade support for stand-
ing to challenge state action or inaction.
The general problem is how to bring some pressure for the public in-
terest to bear on low level visibility administrative and executive decisions.
Stress on procedures, with the courts slowing down decisions so as to bring
them back to legislative and administrative bodies for public focus may
be helpful in the general area of resource decisions. But the problem of
air pollution is more a problem of state and industry inaction than action,
more one of no decisions than shortsighted regulatory decisions. Inser-
tion of the gadfly of citizen initiated actions and increased citizen rights to
question administrative type decisions recommended by this article will be




The presence of other people, values and interests in a society will call
for some mutual accomodation of values. We are not free to totally ig-
nore economic considerations. Certain actions by the legislature and by
existing uses of land are going to injure segments of the population. For
example, a freeway is going to wreak some havoc on adjoining landown-
ers which courts may refuse to enjoin or to give compensation. Dams
are going to injure certain interests, e.g., use of a dam to lower a pond
may ruin the fishing in the interest of promoting log driving. But what
judicial proceeding involving conservation issues and this allows the court to make an indepen-
dent judgment based on conservation in judicial review of decisions of public entities. SENATE
BILL No. 660 (March 18, 1970).
119 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970) agreeing in dictum with Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965) that aesthetic and recreational values may be a basis for challenging administrative
conduct
See also Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohieldian or Ideologi-
cal Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1037-38 (1968) arguing that the Scenic Hudson type
plaintiff is as reliable as one with an economic interest in challenging agency action.
See generally Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L REv. 450 (1970).
120 Under the principal of Qui Tam, where a statute provides a reward for an informer, and
the government fails to bring the action in a reasonable time, the informer himself may sue in
the name of the United States. Such an action has been brought under the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 by a congressman for alleged water pollution. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1970, at 55,
col. 1.
See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L REV. 997, 1005 n.76 (1966) citing
two cases, one involving a Mississippi statute which allowed a private person to bring an action
against the nuisance created by possession of liquor, and a decision in Montana where a private
citizen can seek to enjoin the public nuisance of gambling.
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is required is a redress in certain values revolving around a cleaner en-
vironment to right a balance long favoring economic considerations.
Clearly, the presence of increasing population and urbanization and
other values and interests in the community will not allow perfection in
the environment. But in many respects, though, there are serious distribu-
tion problems, the affluent society is here. Without undue damage, courts
can play a significant role in allocation of resources and in leading us to-
ward new goals of a dean and healthy environment. The alternative is
at least unpleasant, and possibly fatal.
